























































Behavioral elasticities are key to understanding the eﬃciency cost of non-lump sum
taxes. Standard treatments of optimal income taxation take as given behavioral
elasticities derived from immutable preferences, and characterize the tradeoﬀ be-
tween redistribution and the deadweight loss of progressive taxes. Loosely speaking,
larger elasticities imply that less progressive tax systems are optimal. Most of these
models have focused on the elasticity of labor supply, in the belief that the relative
price of leisure and goods is the most important margin aﬀected by taxes. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that, at least for hours worked, the aggregate (compensated)
labor supply elasticity is quite small. However, increasing leisure is by no means the
only possible margin of response to marginal tax rates. When personal tax rates
on ordinary income rise, evasion may increase, businesses may shift to corporate
form, there may be a rise the consumption of deductible activities such as charitable
giving, and individual may rearrange their portfolios and compensation packages to
receive more income as tax-preferred capital gains. All of these responses to higher
taxes will show up in declines in taxable income, and there is a growing body of
evidence, that, at least for high-income individuals, the elasticity of taxable income
is substantial.
As Feldstein (1999) argues, under certain assumptions it is the compensated
elasticity of taxable income, regardless of whether its origin is responsiveness of
labor supply or some other behavior, that summarizes the eﬃciency cost of taxation
and therefore is the crucial parameter in models of optimal progressivity. The idea
is that all tax-induced behavior entails costs that will be incurred until, at the
margin, the private cost equals tax saving. Certain qualiﬁcations to this assertion
are discussed in Slemrod (1998), including the importance of accounting for shifts
across tax bases (individual to corporate, for example) and across time (e.g., a shift
to deferred compensation or greater use of retirement accounts).
One critical qualiﬁcation to the role of the elasticity of taxable income is that it
is not only a function of preferences, and is therefore not immutable. With regard
to labor supply, it is not too egregious to assume, as it became conventional in the
empirical literature, that its elasticity is a primitive value based on preferences.1
However, this assumption is very dubious when considering the other margins of
response to taxation. On the contrary, the magnitude of these behavioral responses
depends on a host of policy decisions about such things as the tax base and how it
is enforced. For example, the responsiveness of evasion depends on the enforcement
regime, the ability to shift the form of business organization depends on the rules
governing the choice, the capital gains realization elasticity depends on how carry-
1It is more heroic, but standard, to assume that the elasticity is constant across individuals
and time. In fact, the labor supply elasticity may depend on labor market institutions such as
work-week regulations.
1over at death is treated, and the size of the tax shelter industry created by high tax
rates depends on the passive loss limitation provisions.2
Recognizing that the elasticity of taxable income is subject to policy control
has intriguing policy implications. For example, Slemrod (1994) demonstrates that
the optimal degree of income tax progressivity given a suboptimal setting of tax
enforcement can be below the globally optimal progressivity. The paper adopts the
metaphor of Okun (1975), in which redistribution is characterized as transferring
water from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket, the degree of leakage represent-
ing the eﬃciency cost of progressive taxes. Using Okun’s language, Slemrod (1994)
raises the possibility that the leak can be ﬁxed, albeit at some cost. Moreover, there
is an optimal rate of leakage that balances the cost of ﬁxing the leak against the
improved eﬃcency of carrying water with a less leaky bucket. Put less metaphor-
ically, there are multiple instruments to an optimal tax system problem, and an
important attribute of a non-tax-rate, or administrative, instrument is its eﬀect on
the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rate. The judicious choice
of these instruments can be thought of as choosing the optimal elasticity of taxable
income. This paper examines what characterizes this optimal elasticity.
The issue of optimal tax administration and enforcement, and their relationship
to the optimal rate structure, has been considered in the prior literature. Several
papers address this problem in a representative agent setting. Mayshar (1991) pro-
vides general criteria for optimal administration and enforcement. Kaplow (1990)
and Cremer & Gahvari (1993) characterize the optimal enforcement and optimal tax
rate structure of commodity taxes. Also in regard to commodity taxation, Yitzhaki
(1979) and Wilson (1989) model the optimal tax base as a tradeoﬀ between the
increased administrative costs, but smaller excess burden, of a larger base. We draw
heavily on their framework in Section 3 of this paper.
In a series of papers, Cremer & Gahvari (1994, 1996) examine the same issue in
the context of setting optimal income tax progressivity in a world of heterogeneous
individuals, and characterize optimal enforcement and the optimal progressivity
when tax evasion is present. However, the speciﬁc framework they use — in which
evasion is a choice made by taxpayers under the prospect of an uncertain audit —
makes it diﬃcult to generalize their results to instruments other than the intensity
of enforcement and the penalties applied, and focuses on the role of taxpayers’
risk preferences. None of the articles in either strand of this literature frames the
question — as we do in what follows — around the elasticity of taxable income or
2It is interesting to note the relation of our point to the inﬂuential critique of macroeconomic
models in Lucas (1976). As does Lucas, we raise the possibility that changes in policy aﬀect
behavioral elasticities, and, as a result, econometric procedures that ignore this possibility may give
misleading results. However, our main argument is diﬀerent. We stress that aﬀecting behavioral
elasticities may be the goal of the policy and not just its by-product, because it may make standard
tax instruments (e.g., tax rates) more (or less) eﬃcient.
2characterizes the central problem as one of choosing its optimal value.
We develop a framework that integrates and systematizes the results of these lit-
eratures by identifying three types of eﬀects that any policy instrument has: a direct
welfare cost, the revenue eﬀect holding the strength of behavioral response constant
and the eﬀect on distortions caused by other tax instruments. Each non-tax-rate,
or administrative, instrument will feature each of these eﬀects, but we stress that
it is the last eﬀect that makes non-tax-rate policy variables fundamentally diﬀerent
from tax rate instruments. In particular, it is this last eﬀect that is responsible for
complementarities between tax design and tax administration, and thus its under-
standing is key in the process of designing the optimal tax system. The optimal
setting of an administrative instrument must balance between its cost and the ben-
eﬁt of reducing distortions; it is this trade-oﬀ that makes us interpret it as choosing
the optimal elasticity.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we characterize the optimal linear income
tax solution when the government has an instrument which aﬀects the elasticity
of taxable income. Recognizing that, in general, such an instrument has also a
redistributive impact as well as an eﬀect on tax revenue, we isolate the value of
just aﬀecting the elasticity. In a special case, when the elasticity is not a function
of the tax rate, the beneﬁt of reducing it is directly related to the deadweight
loss of taxation. Next, we investigate at length a special case in which the policy
instrument which determines the taxable income elasticity is the broadness of the
tax base. In this context, we demonstrate some propositions about the optimal tax
system and the optimal elasticity of taxable income, in particular how they depend
on the primitve parameters of the problem such as the social welfare function and
the cost of administration.
2 The Optimal Linear Income Tax with a Policy
Instrument that Aﬀects the Elasticity of Re-
sponse
We ﬁrst consider the general problem of choosing the optimal linear income tax in
a multi-person economy. In this problem the government must raise R in revenue.3
In the standard version of this problem, it can choose two parameters of a linear
income tax, the marginal tax rate (t) and a uniform lump-sum tax (T). Raising all
of the required revenue using the lump-sum tax would minimize excess burden, but
the population is comprised of people with a distribution of abilities to earn income,
and the government objective function is such that it would be willing to accept
some ineﬃciency in exchange for less inequality in the distribution of welfare. We
3We do not inquire about, nor do we model, how the government disposes of R.
3assume that the society consists of a large number of individuals indexed by the




We modify the standard problem by assuming that the government controls an
instrument m, which inter alia reduces the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to the tax rate, but has a cost of implementation of A(m), A0(m) > 0. Given the
parameters of the tax system, each individual maximizes the utility function that
gives rise to the indirect utility function v(t,T,m,y) and the taxable income function
I(t,T,m,y).4 The total tax paid by the individual is equal to tI + T.
The government is assumed to choose its instruments to maximize a generalized





subject to the budget constraint
T +
Z
tI(t,T,m,y)dF(y) = R + A(m). (2)
We use the concept of the compensated (Hicksian) taxable income denoted by
Ic(t,T,m,y,u) (where u is the utility level), which is the taxable income implied
by a solution to the consumer’s expenditure minimization problem.5 Compensated
4To keep our framework general, we do not specify the utility function, nor do we deﬁne taxable
income explicitly. Some examples of problems that ﬁt into this framework are:
• A standard model with consumption (C) - labor (L) choice and an instrument m that
aﬀects individual’s preferences between these two goods (e.g., a public good or education
of taxpayers about services ﬁnanced through taxes). In this case, the budget constraint is
C = yL − T − tI. Maximization of the utility function u(C,L,m) gives rise to the indirect
utility function and taxable income deﬁned by I = yL.
• A model (as in Mayshar (1991) or Slemrod (forthcoming)) with tax sheltering S, that costs
M(S,yL,m). The utility function u(C,L) is maximized subject to the budget constraint
C = yL−T −t(yL−S)−M(S,yL,m); in this case taxable income is deﬁned as I = yL−S.
• Our example of Section 3. An individual consumes a large number (continuum) of com-
modities, described by a bundle {Ci}i∈[0,1] with utility function u(C). Labor supply is
present in the model, but it is inelastic. The policy instrument m ∈ [0,1] determines the
size of the commodity tax base (equivalently, goods i ∈ [m,1] are income-tax-deductible),
and the budget constraint takes the form of
R 1
0 Ci di = y−T −t(y−
R 1
m Ci di). Consequently,
I = y −
R 1
m Ci di.
Because we allow for primitives other than the utility function (for example, an avoidance tech-
nology), it may be impossible to recover taxable income from the indirect utility function, so that
they may be “independent.”
5In the expenditure minimization problem, the consumer minimizes spending, subject to the
minimum utility constraint. Consequently, we assume that the dual approach is valid, so that
4demand is a well-established concept, and the compensated taxable income is an
aggregation of compensated demands for relevant commodities. Analogously, the











∂E is the income eﬀect. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier by λ, the three ﬁrst-
order conditions, rearranged using the standard results of consumer optimization
(Roy’s identity and the Slutsky equation), are as follows
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where µ denotes the marginal utility of exogenous income (the Lagrange multiplier
from the consumer’s maximization problem), and ε ≡ 1−t
Ic
∂Ic
∂(1−t) is the compensated
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate (1 − t). Stating the
elasticity with respect to (1 − t), rather than with respect to t, is standard in this
literature.
For given m, conditions (4), (5) and the budget constraint determine the solution
to the standard optimal taxation problem. For example, Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980)










λ + t ∂I
∂E is the marginal social valuation of a lump-sum transfer to an
individual. This expression implicitly determines the optimal tax rate and suggests
that optimal progressivity is inversely related to the compensated elasticity of tax-
able income which, in the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, is equivalent to the compensated
elasticity of labor supply.
In the model presented here, the critical elasticity may depend on the choice of
m, so that the optimal progressivity of the tax system cannot be determined inde-
pendently of m. To pursue this idea further, we can write the ﬁrst-order condition
the identity I(t,T,m,y;E(t,T,m,y,u)) = Ic(t,T,m,y;u), where E(·) is the expenditure function,
holds. Diﬀerentiating this identity with respect to the tax rate t, and observing that
∂E(·)
∂t = I,
leads to the Slutsky equation in the text. Notation I and Ic distinguishes uncompensated taxable
income from compensated taxable income, the diﬀerence being that one is a function of exogenous
income while the other is a function of the utility level.











∂m refers to the compensated response of taxable income.6 It is insightful to
further decompose the impact of m on compensated taxable income.7 To do that,









0 Ic(1 − tε
1−t)dt.
Increasing the tax rate by dt increases revenue by Icdt, but it also stimulates a
substitution response that reduces taxable income by dt
1−tε percent for each percent


































The ﬁrst term of this expression represents the direct eﬀect on tax revenue of chang-
ing m. The second term represents the eﬀect on revenue of decreasing the compen-
sated elasticity of taxable income. The impact of this change is positively related
to the tax rate.

























Expression (10) says that, at the optimum, the beneﬁt of increasing m should equal
the marginal administrative cost. The beneﬁt is the sum of the direct eﬀect on social
welfare (denominated in dollars), the revenue eﬀect holding the elasticity constant,
and the beneﬁt of changing the elasticity. Note that all expressions are evaluated at
the constant utility level (in other words, integration is along the indiﬀerence curve).






∂m dtdF(y), is of particular note.
The value to the social planner of a policy instrument is higher (holding its other
eﬀects constant), the more an instrument decreases the compensated elasticity of
taxable income. Furthermore, the beneﬁt of lowering the elasticity increases with
the tax rate and with taxable income. Thus, the more egalitarian is the social
objective function (which manifests itself in higher progressivity), the greater is the
beneﬁt from using this instrument, because the reduction of the compensated taxable
income elasticity is more valuable. This suggests that the elasticity at the optimum,
the optimal elasticity if you will, should be lower in more egalitarian societies. We
return to this issue in section 3.








7Although the decomposition that we consider concerns compensated quantities, a similar ap-
proach may be applied to quantify the beneﬁt of a change in the uncompensated elasticity.
6An interesting special case occurs when the elasticity does not depend on the




1−t dt = ε−1
R t∗
0 Ic dt − t∗Ic

. Inter-
preting Ic as the demand for taxable commodities and t as their price, the term in
brackets can be thought of as the standard (i.e., not including A(m)) deadweight
loss from taxation: it is (minus) the diﬀerence between the amount collected in
distortionary taxes and the amount that a “discriminating” (i.e., one that can im-
pose a person-speciﬁc, arbitrary non-linear marginal tax schedule) tax authority
could collect, with demand evaluated at the constant utility level. Then the beneﬁt
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where εm = − ∂ε
∂m/ε is the proportionate change in elasticity resulting from an in-
crease in m, deﬁned to be a positive number. Equation (11) says that the value to the
social planner of reducing the compensated taxable income elasticity is proportional
to the excess burden.
Although this approach provides a clear intuition for the beneﬁt of a change
in the elasticity, it may be diﬃcult to calculate in practice, because all terms are
evaluated at a constant utility level. In the appendix, an alternative expression is
derived with the beneﬁt of a change in elasticity evaluated at a constant income










but the integration takes place along the budget line instead of an indiﬀerence curve.
The model presented in this section isolates in a very general setting the role of
“elasticity control” in an optimal tax system. However, the generality of the instru-
ment m makes it diﬃcult to establish insightful propositions about the expanded
optimal progressivity problem, although it suggests likely relationships between the
optimal taxable income elasticity and the government’s goals. Practical examples
of m range from the extent of audit coverage, to the deﬁnition of a pass-through
entity, to broadening the tax base. In addition to its eﬀect on the elasticity of
taxable income, any instrument has both eﬃciency and distributional impacts. To
gain further insight, we next examine the optimal elasticity question in a particular
setting in which the elasticity is determined by how broadly the tax base is deﬁned.
8Even if this is not literally true, it may be a useful approximation if the eﬀect of m on elasticity
is much greater than the eﬀect of t. It may also be a useful benchmark for empirical applications,
where it is conventional to assume that elasticities do not depend on prices.
73 A Model of Optimal Progressivity and the Op-
timal Tax Base
The structure of the problem is similar to the general one described before. The
government must raise revenue of R, and can choose three instruments: a lump-
sum tax T, a marginal tax rate t, and a third instrument that, inter alia, aﬀects
the elasticity of taxable income. Rather than being very general about this third
instrument as we were in the previous section, we are now quite speciﬁc: it is the
breadth of the tax base. More details follow.
3.1 The Consumer’s Problem
Consider an economy in which there is a continuous number of commodities. Com-
modities are indexed by a number i ∈ [0,1], and they are denoted by Ci. The
bundle of commodities is written as C (C : [0,1] → R+). In other words, a bundle
of consumption goods is a “vector” containing a continuous number of elements.9
Each individual is characterized by a wage rate of y, and provides inelastically
one unit of labor. She maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function given by u(C) =
exp(
R 1
0 ηi lnCi di), where ηi is the weight of good i.10 Weights are normalized so
that
R 1
0 ηi di = 1.
Pre-tax prices of all commodities are set equal to one. The consumer faces a
tax system characterized by three parameters: t, T and m, where m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 1
denotes the size of the tax base. In a consumption tax framework, this implies that
commodity i is taxed as long as i < m. Equivalently, in an income tax framework
it implies that spending on commodity i ∈ [m,1] is deductible from taxable income.
In a single-period framework like this, these two interpretations are equivalent.
For future reference, following Wilson (1989) and Yitzhaki (1979) we introduce
the notation γ(m) ≡
R m
0 ηi di, where γ(m) is the expenditure share corresponding to
a tax base of m. Note that γ(m) is a monotone transformation of m, and as such it
9We assume that the consumption space includes only measurable functions, and we employ
Lebesgue integrals in what follows.
10The setup of our model is closely related to the models of Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989).
Wilson (1989) considered a more general CES function. In an earlier version of this paper we
generalize the results that follow to the CES case. Most of the propositions in this paper go
through, but some of the proofs are signiﬁcantly more complicated. The main source of complexity
is that, in the CES case, the compensated elasticity of taxable income is a function of the tax rate.
One result that is aﬀected is our corollary 1, which must be qualiﬁed to state that more egalitarian
societies have a lower optimal elasticity of taxable income to the extent that the elasticity of
substitution is less than or equal to one. When it is greater than one, it is still true that the
tax base increases with egalitarianism (acting to reduce the elasticity), but an adjustment in the
tax rate may aﬀect the elasticity in the opposite direction. In the earlier version, we present an
example in which the net eﬀect is an increase in the elasticity.
8may equivalently be used as a policy instrument. The parameter t is the marginal
tax rate imposed on taxable income; we will also use the notation τ ≡ 1−t to denote
the net-of-tax rate. The parameter T is the lump-sum tax. To facilitate the analysis,
with no loss of generality, we use the convention that the lump-sum tax is deductible
from taxable income, so that taxable income is equal to I = y −
R 1
m Ci di − T.
Consequently, the budget constraint of an individual is
Z 1
0
Ci di = y − T − t(y −
Z 1
m
Ci di − T). (13)




(1 − t)ηi(y − T) i < m
ηi(y − T) i ≥ m, (14)
and thus taxable income is equal to I = y − T −
R 1
m ηi(y − T)di = γ(y − T).
Substituting the optimal choices of Ci into the utility function we can also derive
the indirect utility function: v(τ,γ,y − T) = α(y − T)τγ, where α is a constant.
Henceforth, we normalize α to be one.
Finally and critically, but demonstrated in the appendix, the compensated elas-
ticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, denoted ε, is simply
1−γ. Thus, with these assumptions, the choice of tax base immediately determines
the central elasticity in the model. Intuitively, the larger is the set of untaxed com-
modities to which the consumer can turn to in the face of taxation, the larger is the
elasticity.11
3.2 The Government’s Problem
The government’s problem is to choose t, T, and γ to maximize the social welfare





T + tγ(Y − T) = A(γ) + R, (16)
where Y =
R
y dF(y). The choice of the tax base determines the administrative
cost A(γ). Recall that all individuals maximize a homogeneous utility function, and
following Wilson (1989, p. 1199) we assume that, for given γ, those commodities
which minimize A are included in the tax base, so that A0(γ) > 0 and A00(γ) > 0.12
11This is also true in the CES case, where this elasticity is equal to ε = σ(1 −
γ
γ+(1−γ)τ1−σ), σ
being the elasticity of substitution. This expression is decreasing in γ.
12The assumption A0(γ) > 0 was introduced by Yitzhaki (1979), who provided a simple justi-
ﬁcation for this shape. We make this assumption for convenience, but it is not required for our
9Maximization of (15) subject to (16) leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions
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We will denote by X = tγ
R
(y − T)dF(y) = tγ(Y − T) the revenue from distor-
tionary taxes, so that the budget constraint becomes T +X = A(γ)+R. Given the
revenue requirement of R, if X and γ are known, the value of T can be easily found.
For this reason any point in (γ,X) space represents a unique tax system satisfying
the budget constraint. We will concentrate on X as a measure of progressivity,
because in this model progressivity depends not only on t, but on γ as well.
The standard, or what we will call the Mirrlees, optimal income taxation problem
can be thought of as solving for the optimal t and T , for a given tax base of γ. Its
solution is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions (17) and (18), plus the budget
constraint. Solving this problem for all values of γ deﬁnes a curve in (γ,X) space
that we will refer to as a Mirrlees curve. It determines the optimal progressivity
for a given tax base or, equivalently, for a given compensated elasticity of taxable
income.
Contrast this to the problem considered by Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989),
who take the revenue requirement and the lump-sum portion of the tax system
(T) as given, and solve for the optimal γ and t. The solution to this problem is
characterized by ﬁrst-order conditions (18) and (19), plus the budget constraint.
Solving this problem for all values of T deﬁnes a curve in (γ,X) space that we will
refer to as a Yitzhaki-Wilson (Y-W) curve. It determines the optimal tax base for
a given degree of progressivity.
Note that using (18) to get an expression for λ, and substituting for λ in (19)
yields:
A
0(γ) = (t + τ lnτ)(Y − T). (20)
This expression is almost identical to Yitzhaki’s equation 5, and is a special case of
Wilson’s equation 18, that characterize the optimal tax base. The only diﬀerence is
results. In particular we know that, as long as a global optimum exists, administrative costs must
be increasing in its neighborhood — otherwise one could extend the tax base and decrease both
distortions and administrative costs. Consequently, without this assumption, our propositions
should be read as describing the situation in the neighborhood of the optimum only.
We recognize, but do not address, the possibility that, depending how the tax system is admin-
istered, A(1) could be less than A(γ), γ < 1. In other words, a completely broad base may be less
costly to administer than one with exclusions.
10that the term Y −T replaces y in order to account for multiple individuals and the
lump-sum tax. Together with the budget constraint, expression (20) characterizes
the optimal choice of γ and X (or t), given T. The right-hand side of this expres-
sion is the marginal social beneﬁt of expanding the tax base, which is equal to the
marginal reduction in the excess burden from raising a given amount of revenue with
a larger tax base. The left-hand side is simply the marginal resource cost of expand-
ing the tax base. In the models of Yitzhaki and Wilson, the amount of revenue to be
raised by distortionary taxes is ﬁxed, so that the only problem is whether to use a
narrow-base, high-rate system, or a broader-base, lower-rate system. In the problem
considered here, though, the government can also reduce distortionary taxes (and,
therefore, redistribution) by making greater use of lump-sum taxes. Because with a
Cobb-Douglas (or, more generally, a CES) utility function the income elasticity of
all goods is exactly one, there are no distributional implications to whether a given
amount of distortionary tax is raised via a narrow or broad base; thus, for a given R
the value of X is a suﬃcient statistic for evaluating the tax system’s progressivity,
as is the value of T.
Equation (20) can be decomposed as in Section 2. Recall that the social beneﬁt of






∂γ dtdF(y). Substituting expressions




1−t dt = −γ(ln(τ) +
t)(Y −T). It is straightforward to show that this expression is positive and increasing
in both γ and t. Consequently, without this eﬀect the beneﬁt of an increase in γ (the
right-hand side of expression (20)) would be smaller, and the incentive to extend
the tax base to meet the egalitarian goals would be weaker.
How important is the role of a change in the elasticity? To quantify it, we
calculate the share of this beneﬁt in the total beneﬁt of a change in γ, the right-
hand side of equation (20),
−γ(t + ln(τ))(Y − T)







. One can show that ∂B/∂t > 0, B(0) = 1, and
lim
t→1B(t) = +∞. Consequently, for small values of t, the share of the beneﬁt due
to the change in the elasticity is approximately γ. For suﬃciently large t (but less
than one), we have that γB(t) > 1, meaning that the beneﬁt of a change in the
elasticity exceeds the total beneﬁt, i.e., that the sum of all other eﬀects is a net
loss. Consequently, it is only the change in the elasticity that makes an increase
in γ worthwhile (note that the total beneﬁt, the right-hand side of (20), is always
positive). This should not be too surprising: if the elasticity does not change, there
would be limits to redistribution so that, at some point, increments to progressivity
achieved by increasing γ would reduce welfare.
















Figure 1: The Mirrlees and Yitzhaki-Wilson curves and the Optimal Tax System
and the optimal tax system.
3.3 Results
In the problem we consider all of the policy variables, t, T, and γ, are endogenous.
Thus, the global optimum lies at the intersection of Mirrlees and Yitzhaki-Wilson
curves, determining both the progressivity of the tax system and the tax base (which
determines the elasticity). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
We seek to understand how the optimal tax system depends on the key aspects
of the environment. The ﬁrst of our propositions depends on the following lemma:13
Lemma 1 The Yitzhaki-Wilson curve is upward sloping.
We can now state our ﬁrst proposition as
Proposition 1 A more egalitarian society will feature a larger tax base (and a more
progressive tax system).
Notice that the Y-W curve does not depend on the social welfare function: it is
deﬁned by the budget constraint and equation (20), and both of these are invariant
13All proofs are in the appendix.
12to changes in the social welfare function.14 Consequently, an increase in progressivity
corresponds to a shift along the Y-W curve. Thus, either both progressivity and the
tax base increase or they both decrease.
It is not surprising that more egalitarian societies have a more progressive tax
structure. However, in this model, the social planner can increase progressivity by
either increasing the marginal tax rate or by increasing the tax base. Both policy
changes aﬀect tax revenue in a similar way, but increasing the tax base reduces
distortions (and increases administrative costs). Our previous analysis demonstrates
that extending the tax base is more than just a complementary way of making taxes
more progressive. By reducing the strength of the behavioral response, an increase in
the tax base makes a higher marginal tax rate more eﬀective in achieving egalitarian
goals. Consequently, without this eﬀect, the beneﬁt of an increase in the tax base
(the right-hand side of equation (20)) would be smaller, and it is not clear that the
tax base would have to increase at all.
Corollary 1 More egalitarian societies have a lower compensated elasticity of tax-
able income.
Proof: The compensated elasticity of taxable income is equal to 1 − γ, and the
previous proposition established that γ is higher in more egalitarian societies. 2
Our second proposition depends on the three lemmas which also underlie the
pattern of curves in Figure 1. These results assume an isoelastic social welfare
function.
Lemma 2 The Mirrlees curve is upward sloping.
Lemma 3 An increase in egalitarianism shifts the Mirrlees curve up.
Lemma 4 Near the intersection of the two curves corresponding to the global opti-
mum, the Yitzhaki-Wilson curve has a larger slope.
Note that these lemmas allow for a diagramatic description of the experiment in
Proposition 1. An increase in egalitarianism shifts the Mirrlees curve up and, given
the way the curves intersect, it leads to higher progressivity and a broader tax base.
Proposition 2 An increase in the cost of maintaining a broad tax base (i.e., A0(γ∗)
increasing while A(γ∗) stays constant) will decrease optimal progressivity (as well as
the tax base).
14A change in the social welfare function does not aﬀect the tradeoﬀ between t and γ. Because of
the homogeneity of the utility function, neither of these instruments has distributional implications.
13This is the complement to Proposition 1. In this case, changing the marginal cost
of administration does not alter the solution to the Mirrlees problem, so that the
optimum (γ∗,X∗) lies on the original Mirrlees curve. The changing administrative
cost does, though, shifts the Y-W curve, i.e., it changes the optimal mix of t and g
to raise a given amount of distortionary tax. In fact, it must shift upward, so that
for a given γ, the optimal X is higher. Thus, the new optimum features a smaller
tax base, which is not surprising, as well as a less progressive tax system, because
of the higher cost of collecting those revenues.
Corollary 2 A decrease in the cost of maintaining a broad tax base leads to a lower
elasticity of taxable income.
This corollary is immediate, because the elasticity of taxable income moves in-
versely with the tax base.
In a sense, corollary 2 is parallel to corollary 1; in the latter the beneﬁt of ex-
tending the tax base increases, and in corollary 2 the cost decreases. Both situations
naturally lead to a broader tax base being optimal. However, corollary 1 is more
fundamental, because when egalitarianism increases a change in the compensated
elasticity is a crucial part of the response of the social planner. Consequently, if
this eﬀect were not present, the optimal tax base would not have to increase. In
the present case, as long as the optimum is interior (as we assume throughout the
paper), the instrument that becomes cheaper will be used more, regardless of its
eﬀect on the elasticity (although exactly how much more it will be used depends on
this eﬀect).
Figure 1 and the model that underlies it may also be used to demonstrate the
danger of designing tax policy without regard for whether the existing elasticity
of taxable income is appropriate. Consider an initial tax system corresponding to
point A. Based on the elasticity of taxable income for that tax base, the government
correctly decides to choose the tax system represented by point D, that is, to reduce
progressivity. However, the global optimum O corresponds to a higher level of
progressivity than point A.15 Even if one recognizes that other instruments are
available, but fails to recognize their eﬀect on the taxable income elasticity, the
results may still be misleading. The perceived Mirrlees curve would be ﬂatter, but
still crossing point D, because the elasticity would be assumed to be unaﬀected by
γ, and thus the perceived cost of progressivity at higher levels of γ would be higher
than it is in reality. The perceived Yitzhaki-Wilson curve would be to the left of
the actual one, because the beneﬁt of a change in g would be underestimated. The
perceived global optimum would correspond to lower progressivity and a lower tax
base than the actual one, and the corresponding level of progressivity could be lower
than at A.
15For completeness, observe that it is also possible that the level of progressivity suggested by
the standard analysis may be too high, for example if one starts at a point such as B.
14The choice of the income or commodity tax base is an illustration of how policy-
makers have some degree of control over the elasticity of taxable income to the tax
rate. While the details of other examples may certainly diﬀer from what we have
presented here, the underlying intuition will remain.
4 Implications
The optimal progressivity of the tax system depends inversely on the compensated
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. That elasticity is
not entirely an immutable function of consumer preferences and production tech-
nologies, but is subject to manipulation by government policy with respect to tax
administration and enforcement as well as the choice of tax base.
The notion that the elasticity of taxable income can be chosen via the setting
of certain policy instruments has noteworthy implications both for policy and the
empirical analysis of taxation. Although Section 3 focused on cross-jurisdictional
implications, it is of interest to speculate about its implications for a single country’s
tax policy over time. For example, consider its implications for the last major
reform in the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). TRA lowered
statutory tax rates and at the same time broadened the tax base and restricted
the use of tax shelters, both of which arguably reduced the elasticity of taxable
income. This is consistent with the fact that empirical estimates of taxable income
elasticities based on the behavioral response to TRA (Feldstein 1995, Moﬃtt &
Wilhelm 1998, Auten & Carroll 1999) are larger than those based on the behavioral
response to subsequent (1990 and 1993) tax rate changes (Carroll 1998). Although
diﬀerences in methodology and oﬀsetting biases due to unobserved trends may be
partly responsible for the decrease, this paper raises the possibility that the base
broadening provisions of TRA reduced the true taxable income elasticity between the
two periods. More troublingly, this paper raises doubt about longitudinal analyses
of tax reforms which feature changes in both tax rates and (in the case of TRA, as
an objective) changes in the elasticity of taxable income. Comparing pre- and post-
reform behavior to identify the elasticity is problematic, to say the least, because
the elasticity after the reform is diﬀerent from the elasticity before the reform.
If one takes seriously the idea that actual tax policy decisions reﬂect a solution
to a maximization problem like that posed here, many intriguing predictions arise.
For example, one could argue that, once the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was passed and
policy makers became aware that the taxable income elasticity (and the marginal
social cost of increasing progressivity) had declined, they appropriately increased
the progressivity of the tax system by raising the top income tax rates in 1990 and
1993.16 We are aware that many factors are at work in producing tax legislation,
16In terms of Figure 1, TRA moved the income tax system from D to E, and the top rate
15and we are certainly not suggesting that this factor dominates the others, but we
are raising the possibility that a policy maker who controls the elasticity can aﬀect
the resolution of the progressivity issue. The principal message to policy makers
is to be wary of decisions about progressivity based on the existing elasticity of
taxable income: this elasticity is itself subject to control, and may be suboptimal.
Progressivity, and all of the other aspects of a tax system, must be jointly optimized.
Another natural research agenda is to test the cross-jurisdictional implications
of this model. For example, exogenous measures of egalitarian social preferences
should be positively correlated not only with eﬀective tax progressivity, but also the
breadth of the tax base, and be negatively correlated with the observed elasticity of
taxable income. The simultaneous presence of multiple taxes — such as income tax
and value added tax — means that the underlying normative model will have to be
extended in straightforward ways.
increases of 1990 and 1993 moved it from E to O.
16A Appendix
Alternative expression for the beneﬁt of a change in the elasticity Write
the ﬁrst-order condition (18) as
R h
ω0vm
λ + t ∂I
∂m
i
dF(y) = A0(m). Similarly, as in







dt, but because it is uncom-
pensated taxable income that we deal with here, the integration takes place at









dt. Diﬀerentiating this with respect to m and sub-



































The last term on the left-hand side is the social beneﬁt of a change in the elasticity.
The third term is the beneﬁt, holding elasticity constant. The second term accounts
for a change in income, while the ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect on welfare. When the





















The term in the brackets on the right-hand side is the deadweight loss of taxation,
corrected by potential revenue eﬀects.
Derivation of the compensated elasticity of taxable income. Standard















∂τ |u is the compensated response of Ci and E denotes exogenous (non-
taxable) income. Since, by assumption, the lump-sum tax T aﬀects taxable income,










∂τ |u di = I(1 − γ)τ−1,
and the compensated elasticity of taxable income is  = τ
I
∂I
∂τ|u = 1 − γ.
The Yitzhaki-Wilson (Y-W) curve is upward sloping with
dγ
dT > 0 and
dX
dT > 0. The Y-W curve is deﬁned by the budget constraint and equation (20). The
budget line may be used to deﬁne t(γ,T) =
A(γ)+R−T
γ(Y −T) . Diﬀerentiating this expression
and then simplifying yields ∂t
∂T = −
1−tγ
γ(Y −T) < 0 and ∂t
∂γ =
A0(γ)−t(Y −T)
γ(Y −T) < 0. (To see
that the numerator is negative, observe that it is equal to τ ln(τ)(Y − T) from








(it is negative because both the numerator and denominator




dT − 1 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: An increase in egalitarianism increases X and
γ. Consider increasing the concavity of the welfare function, i.e., replacing w by
f(w), where f0 > 0, f00 < 0. The global optimum moves along a constant Y-W
curve (because neither the budget constraint nor equation (20) are aﬀected) and,
given that it is upward sloping, there are two possible cases: both X and γ increase,
while T falls, or both X and γ decrease, while T increases.
To prove the proposition, we need to show that the second case is not possible.
Suppose, on the contrary, that it was the case. Let v1(y) and v2(y) represent the
level of utility of person y with the optimal tax system under the initial and modiﬁed
social welfare function respectively. There must be some individuals who are better
oﬀ under one system, and some who are better oﬀ under the alternative, or else one
of the these tax systems could not be optimal for any social welfare function.
Recall that the indirect utility function is v1(y) = (y−T)τγ. The case that we are
considering is an increase in T, accompanied by a fall in γ and an adjustment in t so
that X falls. Observe that τγ needs to go up, or else everybody would be worse oﬀ as
T increases. It follows that the diﬀerence between the utility of an individual before
and after this change is an increasing function of y, i.e., v2(y)−v1(y) is increasing in
y. In particular, it means that individuals at the the bottom of the distribution are
worse oﬀ, while individuals at the top are better oﬀ. As a result there must exist y∗
such that v2(y∗) = v1(y∗), while for all y < y∗ we have v2(y) < v1(y) and for y > y∗
it is true that v2(y) > v1(y). The same inequalities hold when we compare w(v1(y))
and w(v2(y)). The concavity of f implies that
f(w(v2(y))) < f(w(v1(y))) + f
0(w(v1(y)))[w(v2(y)) − w(v1(y))]
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The second term is negative because
R
w(v1(y))dF(y) is the maximized welfare
under the initial welfare function. Notice that for y < y∗, we have v2(y) < v1(y) and
18f0(w(v1(y))) > f0(w(v1(y∗))),17 and both inequalities change their signs for y > y∗;





f(w(v1(y)))dF(y). This is a contradiction, how-
ever, because the left-hand side is the maximized welfare under the modiﬁed social
welfare function. Thus, the second case is not possible.
The Mirrlees curve is upward sloping. Based on the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions (17) and (18) we deﬁne two terms: MCT +(T,X(t,T,γ);γ) ≡ (1−tγ)−1R
w0τγ dF(y),
and MCX(T,X(t,T,γ);γ) ≡ (Y − T)−1 R
w0τγ−1(y − T)dF(y). MCX is the social
cost, in utils, per dollar of revenue raised by increasing the marginal tax rate, while
holding constant the revenue from the lump-sum tax. MCT + is the marginal so-
cial cost, in utils, per dollar of tax revenue raised by changing the lump-sum tax.
Note that, because of the income eﬀect on revenue, increasing revenue by one dollar
requires raising T by 1
1−tγ dollars, and causes a reduction in the revenue from dis-
tortionary taxes of
tγ
1−tγ. We can combine these two conditions to get the marginal
cost of increasing the revenue from lump-sum taxes by a dollar, while holding the
revenue from distortionary taxes constant. We denote it as MCT(T,X(t,T,γ);γ),
which equals MCT +(1 − tγ) + MCX tγ.
At the optimum MCT is equal to both MCX and MCT +, because the marginal
social cost of collecting an additional dollar by any method must be the same. This
is just a restatement of the ﬁrst-order conditions (17) and (18).
Now consider a perturbation in the given value of γ. Totally diﬀerentiating
























where SOC (which, by the second-order condition, must be positive) equals MCXX−
MCXT − MCTX + MCTT > 0. These formulae decompose the total eﬀect of a
change in γ on X and T into substitution and revenue eﬀects. The former refers
to the fact that a change in γ alters the relative attractiveness of T and X as ways
to raise revenue; the latter refers to the fact that increasing γ has a social cost of
A0, which has to be ﬁnanced by T and X. Intuitively, an increase in γ reduces the
elasticity of taxable income and lowers the relative cost of distortionary taxation.
As a result, one expects that it induces substitution from the lump-sum tax to the
distortionary taxes. In order to formally sign these eﬀects, it will prove useful to
consider the ratio MCT





(y−T)w0 dF(y) is a
17This is implied by the concavity of f, and v1 increasing in y.
19measure of the “distributional characteristic” of the tax system.18 It is higher the
more concave is the social welfare function, and the more unequal is the distribution
of abilities. We will make use of two properties of Ψ:
Property 1 A monotone, concave transformation of the social welfare function in-
creases Ψ.
Proof: Let the original welfare function be w and the transformed one be g(w) where






g0w0 dF(y) . Deﬁning W(x) =
R x
0 w0 dF(y) R
w0 dF(y) and G(x) =
R x
0 g0w0 dF(y) R
g0w0 dF(y) , these expres-




(y−T)dG(y). We also obviously have
lim
y→∞W(y) = 1 and lim
y→∞G(y) = 1. Concavity and monotonicity of g implies that
g0(y1) > g0(y2) if and only if y1 < y2. It follows that
R x





x g0w0 dF(y) < g0(x)
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This condition says that W(x) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates G(x) (although
the context is diﬀerent). Thus
R
(y − T)dW(y) >
R
(y − T)dG(y), which directly
implies the desired result. 2
To demonstrate the next property, we will use the following notation: r ≡ y−T,
p ≡ τγ, so that, the indirect utility of individual is v(t,T,γ;y) = rp = p(y − T).




w0(pr)r dF(y) . Deﬁne also ξ(x) ≡
w00(x)
w0(x)x.
Property 2 For any isoelastic welfare function, ∂Ψ
∂T > 0.
Proof: Consider a change in T of dT and notice that w(p(z−dT)) = g(w(pz)) where
g(x) = w(h(x)−pdT) and h(x) = w−1(x). Using the properties of the inverse func-
tion that w0(h(x))h0(x) = 1 and w00h0h0+w0h00 = 0, we can show that g0(x) = w0h0 > 0
and g00(x) = w00(h(x)−pdT)h0(x)2+w0(h(x)−pdT)h00(x). Substituting for h00, g00 =
w00(h−pdT)h02−w0(h−pdT)w00(h)h02w0(x)−1 =
h02w0(h−pdT)
(h−pdT)h (ξ(h − pdT)h − ξ(h)(h − pdT)).
For an isoelastic welfare function, the term in brackets reduces to ξpdT, so that
18The inverse of Ψ is the (normalized) Feldstein’s (1972) measure of the distributional charac-
teristic of a tax.
20g00 < 0 (because ξ < 0 when w00 < 0), and an increase of T is a concave transfor-
mation of the social welfare function. By property 1, Ψ therefore must increase, so
∂Ψ
∂T > 0. 2
Now, consider the term MCT
MCX, and recall that its arguments are X, T and γ. In
order to calculate the partial derivative with respect to γ, we need to keep X =
tγ(Y − T) constant, so that t must vary inversely with γ; to be precise, dt
dγ =
−t/γ < 0. Because the social welfare function is isoelastic, one can show that Ψ is
not aﬀected by changes in t or γ, and thus ∂ MCT
MCX/∂ γ = Ψt/γ > 0: a larger tax base
reduces the relative social marginal cost of raising revenue via the marginal tax rate,
as opposed to the lump-sum tax. This implies that MCTγMCX−MCXγMCT > 0.
Given that, at the optimum, MCX = MCT > 0, we must have MCXγ < MCTγ.
Now recall equations (6) and (7), in which the ﬁrst term in both formulae is a
substitution eﬀect and the second one is a revenue eﬀect. We have just signed the
numerators of the substitution terms so, given that SOC > 0, the substitution
response is to increase X and decrease T. From property 2, it immediately follows
that ∂ MCT
MCX/∂T > 0: the relative marginal social cost of raising revenue via the
lump-sum tax increases the more it is used. This implies, analogously as above, that
MCTT −MCXT > 0. Thus, the revenue eﬀect on X is also positive, concluding the
proof: X increases when γ increases.
An increase in egalitarianism shifts the Mirrlees curve up. Following the
line of the previous proof, consider MCT
MCX. For given X and T, the transformation of
the social welfare function aﬀects this ratio only through its eﬀect on Ψ. Property 1
guarantees that Ψ increases when the social welfare function becomes more egalitar-
ian, thus increasing the relative marginal cost of T versus X; as before, this implies a
substitution response from T to X. It is the only eﬀect, because the transformation
of the social welfare function does not have a revenue aspect concluding the proof.
Near the intersection of the two curves corresponding to the global
optimum, the Yitzhaki-Wilson curve has a larger slope. Recall that an
increase in egalitarianism does not aﬀect the Y-W curve, shifts the upward sloping
Mirlees curve up and increases both X and γ. This is only possible if the Mirrlees
curve is ﬂatter than the Y-W curve.
Proof of Proposition 2. The previous optimum (γ∗,X∗) still lies on the
orignal Mirrlees curve. As a result, there are only second-order changes in the
solutions of the Mirrlees problem in a neighborhood of the optimum. The changing
administrative cost does, though, aﬀect the Y-W curve; it changes the optimal mix of
t and γ to raise a given amount of distortionary tax. In fact, it must shift upward, so
that for a given γ, the optimal X is higher. To see this, consider if it were otherwise,
so that the optimal X declines which implies, via the budget constraint, that the
corresponding value of T increases. Recall that X = tγ(Y −T), so that, even though
an increase in T aﬀects X, t must fall to keep gross revenue (T +X) constant. But
the right-hand side of expression (20), which has to be satisﬁed on the Y-W curve, is
21increasing in t, and so an increase in T and a decline in t implies that the right-hand
side of this expression needs to fall, as well. Yet, by assumption, the left-hand side
of (20) increases, leading to a contradiction. Intuitively, an increase in the marginal
cost of expanding the tax base must, in equilibrium, be accompanied by an increase
in its marginal social beneﬁt, which occurs in a more progressive tax system. Thus,
γ∗ must now correspond to a lower T and a higher X; in other words, the Y-W
curve shifts upwards. Because the Mirrlees curve is ﬂatter than the Y-W curve, the
global optimum shifts to the left along the Mirrlees curve, corresponding to lower
progressivity and a smaller tax base.
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